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While the Canadian Criminal Code is presently in the process of
thorough going reform by the federal government, one should not lose
sight of the important reforms being proposed in several Canadian
provinces to the legal regimes governing provincial offences. A need for
reform to provincial offence regimes is evident in relation to both
substance and procedure, although the approaches to solving problems in
both spheres has traditionally differed from province to province. At the
level of procedure, some provinces have been content to enforce their
provincial offences through the expedient of adopting by reference the
procedures found in Part XVII of the federal Criminal Code for the
prosecution and trial of summary conviction offences.1 Other provinces
have established complete parallel codes for the enforcement of their own
penal laws, on the theory that there is a sufficient difference in kind
between provincial offences and minor criminal offences that they ought
to be treated quite differently from a procedural point of view.2 Even
those provinces which use the federal summary conviction procedures to
try provincial offences have found it necessary to make exceptional,
streamlined procedures for processing minor violations through systems
of offence tickets and "out of court" payment of fines upon a "plea" of
guilty.3 New proposals for a "Uniform Regulatory Offences Procedure
Act" will shortly be coming forward to the Uniform Law Conference,4
and it will be interesting to see whether it is possible to develop a
consensus around new procedures for the enforcement of provincial
*Bruce P. Archibald, Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law School.
1. For example, Summary Proceedings Ac R.S.N.S. 1989, c.450, s.7.
2. See W.D. Drinkwater and J.D. Ewart, Ontario Provincial Offences Procedure, (Toronto:
Carswell, 1980) passim, and the new but unproclaimed Quebec Provincial Offence Code.
3. See, for example, the Nova Scotia approach, supra, footnote 1.
4. The Uniform Law Conference at its meeting in Saint John, N.B., August 12-17, 1990
received a report from its Committee for a Uniform Regulatory Offences Procedure Act which
constituted drafting instructions for such a statute.
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offences where, historically, different administrative needs and resources
have given rise to very different procedural systems.
It is in the context of this procedural diversity that proposals are also
being made for reform to the substantive law which ought to govern the
imposition of liability for provincial offences. The interplay between the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and recent developments in the common
law principles structuring liability for "public welfare offences" has led to
considerable uncertainty in the law concerning the fundamental bases for
imposing liability for provincial offences. What fault elements, if any,
must be proved in provincial offences? Who bears the burden of proof
and according to what standard? What defences are available? What
punishments can be imposed and under what circumstances? A non-
lawyer might be shocked to learn that under the provincial offence
regimes in most provinces of Canada it is virtually impossible to answer
any of the foregoing basic questions with any satisfactory degree of
certainty. The recent Report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission5
would, if adopted, provide systematic responses to all of these substantive
questions. It is the purpose of this review to assess that Report in the light
of the constitutional requirements and common law doctrines recognized
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Where possible, comparative reference
will also be made to analogous provincial offence reform proposals
originating from the Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform,6 and
the Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan. 7
II. Fault Elements in Provincial Offences
Just prior to the advent of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada, in
a bold stroke of judicial law reform, restructured the whole approach to
"regulatory" or "public welfare" offences in Canada, including all
provincial offences. 8 The landmark Sault Ste. Marie case overturned the
conventional wisdom, dominant since the middle of the nineteenth
century, that there were two types of statutory offences: (a) "true crimes",
where the Crown must prove the external elements (actus reus) and
mental elements (mens rea) beyond a reasonable doubt; and (b) "public
welfare offences of strict or absolute liability", where the simple "doing
of the act" was sufficient for conviction, such that the Crown need only
5. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Basis ofLiabilityforProvincial Offences,
Toronto, 1990.
6. Institute of Law Research and Reform, Report No. 39, Defences to Provincial Charges
Edmonton, 1984.
7. Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, Proposals for Defences to Provincial Offences:
Report to the Minister of Justice, Saskatoon, 1986.
8. P, v. City ofSault Ste. Marie, [19781 S.C.R. 1299; 3 C.R. (3d) 30; 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353.
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prove the external elements beyond a reasonable doubt - no mental
elements or fault requirements need be proved.9
In the Sault Ste. Marie decision, the Supreme Court of Canada found
that there are three kinds of offences:
1. Offences in which mens rea, consisting of some positive state of mind
such as intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by the
prosecution either as an inference from the nature of the act committed,
or by additional evidence.
2. Offences in which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the
existence of mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie
imports the offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid liability by
proving [on a balance of probabilities] that he took all reasonable care.
This involves consideration of what a reasonable man would have
done in the circumstances. The defence will be available if the accused
reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would
render the act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps
to avoid the particular event. These offences may properly be called
offences of strict liability....
3. Offences of absolute liability where it is not open to the accused to
exculpate himself by showing that he was free of fault.10
The trick, of course, in figuring out what needs to be proved by the
Crown for a conviction on any given offence, is to determine what
category the offence falls into. The court in Sault Ste. Marie gave some
guidance on this interpretive question:
"Offences which are criminal in the true sense fall in the first category.
Public welfare offences would prima facie be in the second category. They
are not subject to the presumption of full mens rea. An offence of this type
would fall in the first category only if such words as 'wilfully', 'with intent',
'knowingly', or 'intentionally' are contained in the statutory provision
creating the offence. On the other hand, the principle that punishment
should in general not be inflicted on those without fault applies. Offences
of absolute liability would be those in respect of which the Legislature had
made it clear that guilt would follow proof merely of the proscribed act.
The overall regulatory pattern adopted by the Legislature, the subject
matter of the legislation, the importance of the penalty, and the precision
of the language used will be primary consideration in determining whether
the offence falls into the third category.""1
As all criminal law practitioners know, and as the provincial law reform
proposals considered here demonstrate, there can be significant
9. For a brief description see the Ontario Report, supra, footnote 5, pp. 8-9 or the
Saskatchewan Report, supra, footnote 7 at pp.2-3.
10. Supra footnote 8, at 40 C.C.C. (2d) p. 373-4.
11. Ibid., p.374.
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disagreement as to how to apply these interpretive principles in any given
case, and the decisions of the courts at all levels reflect this. The general
thrust of the post - Sault Ste. Marie decisions, however, has been as a
general rule to place provincial offences in category two, strict liability
(negligence with a reverse onus), and only to classify provincial offences
as being in the mens rea or absolute liability categories in exceptional
cases.
12
The tri-partite classification system of Sault Ste. Marie is now having
to run the gauntlet of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada has
rendered several decisions which have set new constitutional parameters
for assessing the validity of provincial legislation creating offences. In the
B.C. Motor Vehicle Act Reference Case,13 it was held that an offence
which combined absolute liability with a possibility of imprisonment
contravened section 7 of the Charter as a deprivation of liberty not in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Then there is R. v.
Vaillancourt,14 in which the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a
constructive murder provision of the Criminal Code as contrary to
section 7 because it imposed liability in the absence of even objective
foreseeability of death. In that case the constitutionality of negligence or
an objective fault standard for true crime was left as an open question.
Subsequently, in The Queen v. Martineau"5 a majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada held that subjective intent is a constitutional
requirement for a murder charge, although in a judgment released
simultaneously it stated that the objective standard in Criminal Code
section 21(2) (parties to offences by common intent) can only have
application to principal offences where the fault standard is an objective
one. 16 Presumably, on that basis an objective standard for provincial
offences might, in general, be acceptable, although the reversal of the
burden of proof in strict liability is a separate issue to be addressed below.
(a) The Abolition ofAbsolute Liability
The Ontario Law Reform Commission takes the bull by the horns and
advocates the abolition of absolute liability offences. Its recommendation
2(a) states:
12. For comprehensive lists of the post - Sault Ste Marie jurisprudence see: Ontario Report,
pp. 12-13; the Saskatchewan Report, pp. 4-6; and the Alberta Report, pp. 93-123.
13. Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.288, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 486; 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289; 48 C.R. (3d) 289.
14. Valliancourt v.1R., [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636; 60 C.R. (3d) 289; 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118.
15. The Queen v. Martineau, Supreme Court of Canada, unreported, September 13, 1990.
16. The Queen v. Logan and Johnson, Supreme Court of Canada, unreported, September 13,
1990.
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"Absolute liability should be abolished for provincial offences. Liability
for every provincial offence should be based on some minimum
requirement of fault."' 7
Of course, "absolute liability" is a misnomer in any event. The liability
for such offences was "absolute" only in the sense that mistake of fact,
intoxication or other defences related to a negation of a subjective or even
objective fault requirement are unavailable.18 As will be discussed below,
other defences of general applicability are operative in relation to
so-called absolute liability offences. The Alberta and Saskatchewan do
not go so far as to advocate abolition of absolute liability offences.
Instead, they propose that a rule of interpretation be legislatively enacted
to the effect that no provincial offence be construed as one of absolute
liability unless "the enactment in which the offence is created expressly so
provides"' 9 or is "specifically stated to be one of absolute liability". 20
Given this divergence of views, it is important to examine the policy
pros and cons in relation to absolute liability. In this regard the Ontario
Law Reform Commission is very firm. It examines policy arguments
favouring absolute liability in relation to deterrence, efficiency of
enforcement, stigma, respect for the law, and prosecution policy. In
relation to deterrence, it concludes ".... the punishment of honest
mistakes and unavoidable accidents will not, in fact, exact greater
deterrence to unlawful behaviour." 21 On efficiency, it states "... in the
twelve years since the creation of strict liability offences, it has not been
demonstrated that legislation is unenforceable where it has been classified
as imposing strict liability." Concerning the stigma associated with
provincial as opposed to criminal offences, it finds that "... some
opprobrium may well attach to the commission of many absolute liability
offences" and that "... serious penalties, such as a substantial fine or the
loss of a license, may be imposed for such offences", z3 On maintaining
respect for law enforcement, the Ontario Law Reform Commission
agrees with the Supreme Court of Canada, that "criminalizing blameless
conduct leads to 'cynicism and disrespect' for the law on the part of the
community." 24 Finally, the Ontario Law Reform Commission argues,
with reliance in part on studies undertaken by the Law Reform
17. Ontario Report, p.45.
18. The Saskatchewan Report makes this point at pp. 13-15.
19. Saskatchewan Report, Recommendation 4, p.16.
20. Alberta Report, Recommendation 2, p.84.
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Commission of Canada25 and the English Law Commission,26 that
prosecution policy will remain unchanged with the abolition of absolute
liability since in virtually all regulatory areas some degree of fault is
required before a decision is made to institute proceedings. 27
The main objection to absolute liability, is that it is contrary to the
basic moral and legal proposition that one ought not to be punished for
conduct which one does not intend, did not or could not foresee, and
cannot control. As the Saskatchewan Law Reform Commission admits,
"... the Supreme Court of Canada retained the concept of absolute
liability without clearly establishing a principle to justify it."'28 However,
the Saskatchewan and Alberta proposals each retain absolute liability
without providing the necessary justification, albeit in "exceptional cases"
to be specifically identified by the legislature.29 One might be forgiven in
entertaining the suspicion that the two bodies were reluctant to buck the
tide of conventional wisdom that absolute liability is "part of the system",
for fear that a frontal attack on the status quo might reduce the political
acceptance of their other valuable and less controversial proposals. The
Ontario Law Reform Commission is to be commended for its forthright
decision to oppose absolute liability. It is an imperial policy which "has
no clothes," and has no place in Canadian democracy under the Charter.
(b) Appropriate Standards of Fault for Provincial Offences
The Ontario Law Reform Commission proposals also break new ground
in setting out fault standards for provincial offences. Three situations
would be provided for in an interpretation section to be added to the
Ontario Provincial Offences Act. The first situation is where "... the
Legislature expressly uses language connoting an aware state of mind
(mens rea), such as 'knowingly', 'intentionally', 'recklessly', 'wilfully
blind' or other similar words. °30 This provision for provincial offences
based on "subjective" fault principles is also the policy in the
Saskatchewan proposal, which states: "An enactment creates an
intentional offence if it: (a) prohibits a person from engaging in conduct
knowingly, intentionally, maliciously, wilfully, or without lawful excuse;
25. Law Reform Commission of Canada Studies in Strict Liability, Queens Printer, Ottawa,
1974, pp.63 -15 2.
26. The Law Commission, Strict Liability an the Enforcement of the Factories Act, Working
Paper No. 30, H.M.S.O., London 1970.
27. Ontario Report, p.44 .
28. Saskatchewan Report, p. 9.
29. Saskatchewan Report, Recommendation 3, p.16; Alberta Report, Recommendation 2,
p.84.
30. Ontario Report, pp.45 and 53.
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or (b) otherwise expressly includes intention on the part of the accused as
an element of the offence". 31 The Alberta proposal also foresees the
continued creation of provincial "mens rea offences" using language
virtually identical to that adopted by the Saskatchewan proposals.32
The second fault standard advanced by the Ontario Law Reform
Commission for provincial offences is that of simple or ordinary
negligence which it calls "strict liability". 33 The gravamen of the offence
would be the failure of the defendant to act with "reasonable care" in the
circumstances. This would be the same standard as adopted by the
Supreme Court of Canada for strict liability offences in Sault Ste. Marie
with the important difference that, unlike the court decision, the Ontario
proposals would not reverse the burden of proof on the negligence issue
but would substitute a mandatory presumption. By contrast with the
Ontario commission, the Saskatchewan and Alberta commissions
essentially advocate a statutory restatement of the Sault Ste. Marie strict
liability approach including the reversal of the onus of proof. As far as the
negligence standard is concerned, the Saskatchewan proposals provide a
defence where the accused "... exercised reasonable care to avoid or
prevent the performance of the acts constituting the commission of the
offence" or "reasonably believed in a state of facts which if correct would
not have constituted the commission of an offence by him". 34 The
Alberta proposals take essentially the same approach, but in verbally
formulating the simple negligence standard for strict liability speak not
only of "no negligence" and "reasonable mistake", but also "due
diligence" - following the Supreme Court in Sault Ste. Marie 5
The third fault standard proposed for provincial offences by the
Ontario Law Reform Commission is that of a "marked and substantial
departure from the conduct of a reasonable person in similar
circumstances."36 Here one senses the guiding hand of Professor Don
Stuart, the chief consultant on the Ontario Commission's Report and
long time proponent of this standard for criminal negligence.37 It is to be
noted that the Ontario Court of Appeal,38 as well as a substantial
minority of the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted this standard as
the test of criminal negligence under Criminal Code section 219.39 In
31. Saskatchewan Report. Proposed Legislation, s.3, p.17.
32. Alberta Report, Recommendation 2, p.84.
33. Ontario Report, pp. 45 and 53.
34. Saskatchewan Report, Proposed Legislation, s.5, p.17.
35. Alberta Report, Recommendation 1, p.84 .
36. Ontario Report, pp. 4 6 and 53.
37. Don Stuart, Canadian CriminalLaw (2nd. Ed) Carswell, Toronto, 1987, pp. 183-196.
38. R. v. Sharp (1984), 39 C.R. (3d) 367; R. v. Barron (1985), 48 C.R. (3d) 334.
39. . v. Tutton [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392; 69 C.R. (3d) 289.
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addition the Law Reform Commission of Canada has adopted this
standard in its proposed Draft Criminal Code.40 This is an objective
standard, in that one is concerned not with the accused's state of mind but
rather with what a reasonable person would do in the circumstances.
However, it is more than simple or ordinary negligence by virtue of the
requirement for proof of a "marked and substantial departure" from the
standards of the reasonable person. Proponents hope the language will
not drag criminal courts back into the morass of distinguishing "ordinary
negligence" from "gross negligence" in the manner of tort litigation.
Whether this will be the case remains to be seen.
The Ontario Commission adopts the "marked and substantial
departure" standard in the belief that "mere carelessness should not result
in a prison sentence", with the corollary that "a higher standard of fault
should apply before such a serious penalty may be imposed by the court".
It therefore recommends that:
"Before imprisonment can be imposed for a provincial offence, either an
aware state of mind or a marked and substantial departure from the
conduct of a reasonable person in similar circumstances should be
required to be alleged and proved."41
Presumably this provision will withstand constitutional scrutiny under
Charter section 7, since it appears that the Supreme Court of Canada
through views expressed in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference,
Vaillancourt, Martineau, and Logan cases, will countenance the
combination of objective liability and imprisonment if there is a
proportional relationship between the degree of culpability, seriousness
or stigma of the offence, and the nature of the penalty.
III. Burdens of Proof in Provincial Offence Prosecutions
It is common ground that in proving the external elements (actus reus)
of provincial offences, as in criminal law matters proper, the burden is on
the Crown to prove all the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable
doubt. There is considerable diversity of opinion abroad in the land,
however, when it comes to burdens of proof in relation to fault elements
in provincial offences.
Where subjective awareness is an element of the offence, whether as
intention, knowledge, recklessness or some other variant, the general
view is that the offence should be treated as a true crime. As such the
40. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report 31, Recodifying CriminalLaw - A Revised
and Enlarged Edition of Report 30, Ottawa, 1988.
41. Ontario Report, p. 46.
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Crown bears the burden of proving this mental element beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Ontario Law Reform Commission states:
"The traditional burden of proof in mens rea offences should be retained.
The prosecution should continue to be required to establish both the
physical element and the mental element of the offence beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction."42
Similarly, in retaining intentional offences, the Saskatchewan Law
Reform Commission maintains, almost as a matter of definition, that
".. . the prosecution must prove intention on the part of the accused". 43
In like manner, the Alberta proposals provide that where mens rea is an
element of a provincial offence. "The prosecution shall bear the burden
of proving the mens rea of the accused and discharge the burden ... by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt."44 The only dissenting view of note is
the majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the aberrant
case of Strasser v. Roberge45 which is roundly criticized 46, rarely cited,
and rightly thought to be confined to its facts.
The hallmark of absolute liability offences, of course, is that the Crown
need not prove fault, whether in subjective or objective terms, and the
accused cannot exculpate him or herself by proving or providing
evidence of an absence of fault. As the Saskatchewan Law Reform
Commission states in its draft Provincial Offence Act:
An absolute liability offence is an offence in which:
(a) the prosecution is not required to prove intention or negligence on the
part of the accused; and
(b) defences that negate intention or negligence on the part of the accused
are not available to the accused,47
The Alberta report states perhaps somewhat unguardedly that "an
offence is an absolute liability offence if the enactment uses words
indicating that the accused person is liable to be convicted whatever his
state of mind". 48 On the face of it, there thus appear to be no burden of
proof problems in relation to mental elements of absolute liability
offences. Perhaps the matter should be left simply at that. However, in the
case of Vaillancourt the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
42. Ontario Report, p.53.
43. Saskatchewan Report, Proposd Legislation s. 3, p. 17.
44. Alberta Report, p.4.
45. Strasserv.Roberge, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 953.
46. Stuart, supra, footnote 37, has described it as "an astounding perversion in principle" in
his first edition at p. 169.
47. Saskatchewan Report, p. 17.
48. Alberta Report, p. 2.
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seemingly purports to be capable of divining the "essential elements" of
offences, presumably by assessing the proportionality of the seriousness of
the conduct to the degree of seriousness of the penalty. Courts may find
offences missing "essential elements" to be simply unconstitutional, but
they could also read in new requirements, such as mental elements. This
opens the possibility for courts to read mental element requirements into
absolute liability offences rather than striking them down. The potential
results of such a process are mind boggling from a number of points of
view.
The central distinction between the Ontario Law Reform Commis-
sion's approach to strict liability offences and that of the other provincial
commissions and the Supreme Court of Canada relates to burdens of
proof and presumptions. Following the Court, the Alberta Institute of
Law Research and Reform advises that "the burden of proof should be
on the accused on a balance of probabilities" in relation to the "due
diligence" or "reasonable mistake of fact" defences which characterize its
version of strict liability. 49 Using slightly different wording the
Saskatchewan proposals reach the same results by saying "the accused
shall be acquitted where he establishes on a balance of probabilities" that
he used reasonable care or acted pursuant to a reasonable mistake of
fact.50 The Ontario Law Reform Commission rejected the use of a reverse
onus approach for its version of strict liability. In doing so, it reviews with
care the cases which have recently been decided by the Ontario Court of
Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada concerning the constitutionality of
reverse onus clauses and mandatory presumptions. It then concludes that
"[s]everal decisions rendered by the Ontario Court of Appeal have
indicated that mandatory presumptions are more likely than reverse onus
clauses to be found demonstrably justified under the section 1 Oakes
test."51
On the strength of this analysis, the Ontario Commission then makes
the following recommendation concerning proof of the elements of what
it still calls "strict liability" offences:
"A mandatory presumption rather than a reverse onus should exist in strict
liability offences. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, negligence
should be presumed. In a strict liability case, it should be necessary that
evidence of conduct capable of amounting to reasonable care be adduced,
either by the testimony of the defendant, through the examination or cross-
examination of a Crown or defence witness, or in some other way. The
defendant should not be obliged to establish that she was not negligent on
49. bid, Recommendation 5, p. 85.
50. Saskatchewan Report, p. 17.
51. Ontario Report, p. 37.
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a balance of probabilities. Where such evidence of reasonable care has
been adduced, thereby rebutting the presumption, in order to secure a
conviction the prosecution should be required to establish the defendant's
negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. 52
The upshot of this approach is that the prosecution can still obtain a
conviction upon proof of the external elements (actus reus) of the
offence. This is common to absolute and strict liability offences according
to Sault Ste. Marie as well as the Saskatchewan and Alberta proposals.
The difference with the latter formulations of strict liability is that under
the proposed Ontario approach an accused would merely have to meet
an evidential burden, that is, some evidence of reasonable care on the
record capable of raising a reasonable doubt, in order to require the
Crown to assume the normal burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
on the negligence issue. Under this view, negligence is clearly a fault
element in the offence, which the Crown may prove with the aid of the
presumption upon proof of the external elements. Under Sault Ste. Marie
and the Alberta and Saskatchewan approaches, the accused would have
both an evidential and a persuasive burden on the negligence issue, cast
in terms of a defence rather than as an element of the offence. In these
latter cases, the practical burden on the Crown, where the accused seeks
to prove no negligence, is to prove negligence only on a balance of
probabilities, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. It is submitted that
the Ontario approach is sound policy, consistent with the principles of
fundamental justice, and to be preferred over the present law and the
other proposals which would merely restate that present law.
IV. Defences to Provincial Offences
Analysis of the common law reveals that defences to crimes can be
divided into the following categories:53 (a) failure of proof defences,
where the accused argues that the Crown has failed to prove an element
of the offence (for example, evidence of automatism, alibi, physical
compulsion and impossibility can be said to "negate" proof of the
external elements, while evidence of mistake of fact, intoxication and
automatism may negate proof of the mental elements); (b) justifications,
where a rule applies in the circumstance to legalize the otherwise criminal
conduct (self-defence, defence of property, lawful authorization, etc.); (c)
excuses, where an accused suffers from some medical or situational
incapacity recognized by law which vitiates his or her control over the
52. b , p. 53.
53. For a full discussion of this classification of defences, see Bruce P. Archibald, "The
Constitutionalization of the General Part of Criminal Law", 1988, 67 Can. Bar. Rev. 403.
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otherwise criminal conduct (insanity, automation, duress, necessity etc.);
and (d) non-exculpatory defence, where the elements can be proved and
the conduct is not justified or excused, but public policy recognized by
law prevents conviction (procedural defences such as limitation periods,
or defences such as abuse of process, or state induced error). At the
federal level, many of these defences have been codified for nearly a
century, while others have been left to develop as matters of common
law.M At the provincial level, where there has been no substantive
codification, the nature of these various defences and their applicability to
provincial offences is sometimes difficult to determine.
The failure of proof defences have not been codified even at the federal
level, but there is abundant Canadian case law discussing the nature of
the elements of offences and how they are to be proved. Of course, any
defences relating to failure to prove the mental elements of offences, such
as simple mistake of fact, intoxication and mental disorder short of
insanity, will not be available for provincial strict or absolute liability
offences where subjective mental elements need not be proved 5
Common law justifications, excuses and non-exculpatory defences are
in principle applicable in relation to provincial offences. Unlike the
legislation in many provinces, the present Ontario Provincial Offences
Act makes this proposition explicit in its section 80:
"Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any
circumstance a justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge
continues in force and applies in respect to offences except in so far as they
are altered by or inconsistent with this or any other Act. '56
However, since many of these defences have been restated in the federal
Criminal Code, Canadian jurists have by and large abandoned
consideration of the ancient English case law in which these defences
have their roots. While the Criminal Code reformulations are thus not
technically applicable to provincial offences, sometimes courts have held
that the Criminal Code provision is a current and valid statement of the
common law rule which is relevant to the provincial case at hand.57 In
other cases, such as duress and mistake of law, it appears that the
Criminal Code formulation and the developments in the common law are
divergent, and that the common law rule is applicable to the provincial
offence under consideration. 58
54. On the relationship between codified and common law defences see R. V. Kirzner (1977),
1 C.R. (3d) 138; 38 C.C.C. (2d) 131 (S.C.C.).
55. The Saskatchewan Report makes this point at pp. 13-14.
56. R.S.O. 1980, c. 400.
57. R v. MacDougalM [1982] 2 S.C.R. 605; (1982) 1 C.C.C. (3d) 65; 31 C.R. (3d) 1.
58. R v. Cancoil Thermal Corp. andParkinson (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 295; 52 C.R. (3d) 188
(Ont. C.A.) (mistake of law); R v. Pacquette (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 417 (S.C.C.) (duress), and
R. v. Morrison andMcQueen (1980), 54 C.C.C. (2d) 447 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
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The Ontario and Saskatchewan proposals present a simple and clean
solution to this confusing problem of the sources and scope of defences
to provincial offences. The Ontario proposal reads as follows:
"Every rule or principle of the common law, and every provision of the
Criminal Code as amendedfrom time to time that is not limited to a specific
offence, that renders any circumstance a justification or excuse or an act
or omission, or a defence to an offence, should be available to a person
charged with a provincial offence, except in so far as it is altered by or
inconsistent with any other Act" (Emphasis added).59
This has the advantage of making uniform the federal and provincial law
on defences, while leaving open the possibility of developments in the
coilmon law and reform to the codified law. The Saskatchewan
provision is essentially identical.60 Unfortunately, the Alberta proposals
do not incorporate the Criminal Code provisions, and might increase
confusion by introducing special provincial rules on the defence of state
induce error of law and by abolishing the possible use of the insanity
defence for provincial offences. 61 The Ontario and Saskatchewan
approach is to be commended as a practical solution, eminently advisable
for adoption in other provinces.
The issue of burdens of proof also arises in relation to defences to
provincial offences. The general criminal law rule is that, subject to
limited statutory exceptions, the Crown bears the burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt not only in relation to the elements of the
offence, but also in relation to any justifications or excuses which have
been made live issues through compliance with a simple evidential
burden upon the defence. That is, the Crown need not disprove all
defences in the abstract, but need only disprove beyond a reasonable
doubt those justifications or excuses in relation to which there is sufficient
evidence to put the matter before a jury. In relation to most non-
exculpatory defences, the accused bears the burden on a balance of
probabilities of proving the existence of circumstances which would
disentitle the Crown to its conviction. This is the general framework of
analysis applicable to federal and provincial offences which, in broad
outline, has been found constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court of
Canada.62
Special statutory rules concerning the burden of proof have been
introduced in relation to some defences to provincial offences. The
59. Ontario Report, pp. 51 and 54.
60. Saskatchewan Report, p. 18.
61. Alberta Report, Recommendations 6-9, pp. 85-89.
62. See R. v. Mack (1988), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 513; 67 C.R. (3d) 1, and Archibald, supra,
footnote 53 at no. 442-452.
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present Ontario rule in section 48(3) of the Provincial Offences Act
reads:
"The burden of proving that an authorization, exception, exemption or
qualification prescribed by law operates in favour of the defendant is on
the defendant, and the prosecutor is not required, except by way of
rebuttal, to prove that [it] does not operate in favour of the defendant,
whether or not it is set out in the information".63
Those provinces which have adopted by reference the summary
conviction procedures in the Criminal Code for the enforcement of their
provincial offences are governed by an analogous rule in Code section
794.64 In that provision, however, the list of defences in relation to which
the burden of proof is said to be reversed is different. Unlike the Ontario
rule, it includes "proviso" and "excuse", and omits "authorization".
The Ontario Law Reform Commission takes the position that this
blanket reverse onus provision for defences is in contravention of the
presumption of innocence enunciated in section 11 (d) of the Charter, and
is likely to be beyond redemption under Charter section 1. The Ontario
proposals recommend that the provision be repealed. The discussion of
this issue in the Report is not entirely clear. It seems based on the premise
that the general reverse onus provisions are applicable primarily in
licensing situations on the issue of whether the accused possessed the
required license. In this context the Ontario Report states:
"Accordingly, the Commission recommends that the burden of proof in
licensing and similar types of offences should be treated in the same way
as other provincial offences. The proposed mandatory presumption should
govern; a persuasive burden of proof should not be imposed on the
accused."65
It therefore appears that the Ontario approach would remove any reverse
onus in relation to the specific defences mentioned in Ontario Provincial
Offences Act, s. 48 and that general principles would operate to prevent
shifting of burdens to the accused on anything other than non-
exculpatory defences, unless an enactment otherwise provided. The
Albeita proposals would have the Crown bear the burden of disproving
live common law defences, while shifting the burden to the accused the
burden of proof on reasonable mistake of law.66 This, of course, is
consistent with the distinction made above between justifications and
excuses on the one hand and non-exculpatory defences on the other. In
63. Supra, footnote 56.
64. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
65. Ontario Report, p. 49 .
66. Alberta Report, p. 84-87.
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order to avoid the constitutional problems with using the general reverse
onus in section 794 of the Criminal Code, those provinces which adopt
the summary procedure provisions of the Code to enforce their provincial
offences would be well advised to follow the Ontario lead, and exclude
the applicability of section 794 to provincial offences.
V. Penalties for Provincial Offences
Sentencing is sometimes seen as a matter of criminal procedure, and
penalties are often not discussed when looking at the substantive law
governing liability for offences. Thus, it is not surprising that the Alberta
and Saskatchewan proposals are silent on this issue. On the other hand,
it is the sentence which gives practical meaning to a finding of guilt.
Moreover, in analyzing the principles of fundamental justice under
section 7 of the Charter, and the concept of cruel and unusual
punishment under section 12, the Supreme Court of Canada directs us to
the nature of the stigma of the penalty and whether there is
proportionality between the seriousness of the offence (including degrees
of culpability) and the seriousness of the punishment.67 It is therefore
significant and appropriate that the Ontario Law Reform Commission
proposals address not only the fault standard where imprisonment can be
imposed, as discussed above, but also the problem of imprisonment for
nonpayment of a fine.
Statutory provisions which impose mandatory periods of imprison-
ment in the event of failure to pay a fine are now constitutionally
suspect.68 Moreover, the practice of some judges of imposing a default
order at the time of imposing a fine, without evidence of an accused's
intention to default or inquiry into the accused's ability to pay, has been
described as an abuse of judicial discretion. 69 Following the Canadian
Sentencing Commission, the Ontario Report, "as a matter of principle
and for ... constitutional reasons" firmly takes the position that "a fine
defaulter should not be imprisoned solely because she does not have the
financial resources to pay the fine imposed by the court. '70
To accomplish this end the Ontario Report proposes the statutory
enactment of two policies. The first is that "the Provincial Offences Act
67. See Bruce P. Archibald, "Crime and Punishment: the Constitutional Requirements for
Sentencing Reform in Canada", (1988), 22 Revue juridique themis 307, and Arkell v. The
Queen Supreme Court of Canada, unreported, September 13, 1990.
68. See Keith Jobson and Andrew Atkins, "Imprisonment in Default and Fundamental
Justice" (1986), 28 C.L.Q. 251.
69. RE. Kimball, "In the matter of Judicial Discretion and the Imposition of Default Orders"
1990,33 C.L.Q. 467.
70. Ontario Report, p.4 9.
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should be amended to ensure that only clearly wilful defaulters are
imprisoned for failure to pay a fine."'71 The second is a provision to
ensure that "unless it is unreasonable to do so, the fine option programme
under ... the Provincial Offences Act, and the civil enforcement
procedure ... , ought to be resorted to before a warrant of committal is
issued."72 By the adoption of such measures the Ontario Commission
hopes to ameliorate the situation where 27% of Ontario's prison
population is in jail for failure to pay a fine. The same results could be
achieved in provinces where legislation inhibits use of imprisonment in
default and where fine options programmes are available.73 The
straightforward approach proposed for Ontario, however, may be a
better means of ensuring judicial adherence to more enlightened policies
for the enforcement of provincial offences.
VI. Conclusions
The Ontario, Saskatchewan and Alberta law reform organizations are to
be congratulated for their important steps toward the development of
provincial offence regimes which are in accordance with sound policy
and constitutional standards of fundamental principles of justice. The
Ontario Law Reform Commission, in reliance on the progress made by
law reformers who have gone before and in the light of evolving Charter
litigation, has provided a most sophisticated yet simple model for putting
liability for provincial offences on a principled basis. It is to be earnestly
hoped that legislators in Ontario will adopt the proposals so carefully
articulated by their Law Reform Commission. In the interests of the
proper administration of justice, legislators in other provinces would be
well advised to follow suit. If they are unwilling to take an active law
reform stance on these questions of liability for provincial offences,
Charter litigation may soon force the issue.
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71. bid, p. 49.
72. ibid, p. 4 9.
73. See for example, the Alternative Penalty Ac4 Stats. N.S. 1989, c.2; and the Summary
Proceedings Act, supra, footnote 1, s. 12.
